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ON INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK AND THE 
INTERNET: THE LANHAM ACT’S LONG ARMS 
 
Joshua Clowers* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: TRADEMARK LAW, THE LANHAM ACT, AND THE 
INTERNET 
 
A.  AN OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK LAW 
 
[1] Trademarks tie a face to a product.  The face is often a name or 
symbol, but it can also be something like a sound, a smell or even a 
“look.”1  They exist for the benefit of both the trademark owner/producer 
and the consumer.  The purpose of a trademark, traditionally, has been to 
protect against the confusion of consumers when selecting products or 
services.2  Yet, a trademark’s functionality is not limited to preventing 
confusion.  Other uses include both preserving the goodwill of the 
consumer for the mark owner and preventing the “diversion of trade 
through commercial misrepresentations.”3  Trademark is a system by 
                                                 
 
* J.D., 2006, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law.  Mr. Clowers is an 
Associate at the law firm of Dunton, Simmons & Dunton in White Stone, Virginia.  He 
served as the Annual Survey Editor for the Richmond Journal of Law & Technology in 
2005-2006.  He completed his B.A. in Political Science at Virginia Tech and has an 
extensive technical and computer background.  He wishes to thank his advisor, Professor 
James Gibson, for his guidance and support in this endeavor, and Beth, for her constant 
inspiration and for letting him keep his aquarium at her house. 
 
1 The concept of “trade dress” (essentially the “look” of a product) has repeatedly been 
upheld as protected under the Lanham Act.  See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. 
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); see also Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, 15 
U.S.C. 1125(a) (2000). 
2 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989). 
3 Steven M. Auvil, Gray market Goods Produced by Foreign Affiliates of the U.S. 
Trademark Owner: Should the Lanham Act Provide a Remedy?, 28 AKRON L. REV. 437, 
447 (Spring 1995). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue1 
 
 
 
2
which consumers may choose between readily identifiable and 
distinguishable goods based on the reputation of a manufacturing 
company.4  Congress has regarded trademark protection as being an 
indispensable component of American business, as it provides the 
necessary incentive to a business to maintain quality standards in order to 
preserve the value of their trademark.5  Because of this considerable value, 
Congress has designated that the government should afford trademarks the 
greatest protection possible within the United States.6 
 
[2] The value of trademarks to producers and other trademark owners lies 
in a mark’s capability to lower the search costs for consumers, thus 
generating value in the form of what has been termed “information 
capital.”7  Information capital is a value embodied by the message or 
reputation conveyed by the trademark.8  Trademarks perform a filtering 
function for consumers, wherein they are able to lower the time and cost 
expended searching for a product based on the trustworthiness of a 
producer’s mark.9  Without the safeguard of law offered to a trademark, 
the utility of this filtering function is rendered into what amounts to “lame 
duck”10 protection, both for the consumer and the producer.11  A producer 
who properly maintains quality and service standards for its mark will be 
able to take advantage of the economic benefits resulting from the maxim 
of a consumer’s willingness to pay higher prices for the assurances that 
come with a familiar and reputable mark.12  This economic benefit, 
however, again depends completely on the protection offered to a mark 
                                                 
 
4 Dupont v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.A.N.N. 1274, 
1277. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 1277. 
7 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 
78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270 (May – June 1986). 
8 Id. 
9 Landes, supra note 7, at 271. 
10 The term “lame duck” here is meant to indicate the ineffectiveness of something 
purported to be serving a function.  While the term is typically applicable to an elected 
officer who is sitting in office but not continuing into the next term, it seems appropriate 
to characterize this circumstance as such. 
11 Landes, supra note 7, at 270. 
12 Id. 
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holder from the “free riding”13 of competitors and other profit-seekers 
aiming to dilute, infringe upon, or otherwise benefit from another’s 
trademark.14  Without this protection, the incentive for developing a 
valuable trademark in the first place dissipates.15 
 
[3] At common law, trademark consisted of a word, phrase, logo, pattern, 
color, design, or other indicator of the source of a product.16  During the 
evolution of trademark law, mechanisms that qualify as a trademark for 
protection purposes have been extended to sounds and smells in addition 
to their visual counterparts.17  It is possible that even digital signatures or 
cryptographic marks, so long as they still serve the basic trademark 
purpose of indicating the source of a product may qualify for at least some 
level of trademark protection as the evolution of trademark law 
continues.18 
 
[4] The most commonly cited test for finding trademark infringement 
comes from the Polaroid case, which sets out a series of factors a court 
must weigh in determining whether an entity has used a trademark in such 
a way that would result in a “likelihood of confusion” in the mind of a 
consumer regarding the source of a product.19  The Polaroid likelihood of 
confusion test considers eight different factors: 
 
(1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) the degree of 
similarity between plaintiff's mark and defendant's mark; 
(3) the proximity of the products or services; (4) the 
likelihood that the plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5) 
                                                 
 
13 See id. (stating that the concept of free riding in relation to trademarks refers to a 
trademark owner’s competitor attempting to duplicate the owner’s valuable trademark in 
an effort to dupe a consumer into believing the free rider’s brand is identical to the 
valuable trademark owner’s brand, thus allowing the free rider to garner profits). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, vol. 
1, § 3:1 (4th ed. 1997). 
17 Id. § 7:104. 
18 Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 
695, 699 (Summer 1998). 
19 Poloroid Corp. v. Polorad Elec. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 287 
F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). 
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evidence of actual confusion; (6) defendant's good faith in 
adopting the mark; (7) the quality of defendant's product or 
service; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.20 
 
Based on these, if a court determines that the totality of the circumstances 
leads to the conclusion that a reasonable consumer would be confused as 
to the source of a product based on mark, there is a violation of the 
trademark law.21  This is called “dilution,” and it exists to prevent 
garnering profit through the use of another’s mark.22 
 
[5] Thus far, this article has only broached the tip of the iceberg regarding 
the fundamentals of trademark theory, but it is sufficient to lay the 
necessary foundation for the remainder of this article. 
 
B.  THE HISTORY OF THE LANHAM ACT 
 
[6] The Lanham Act23 provided for the first time both substantive and 
procedural rights in trademark.24  Congress implemented the Act in 1946 
in an effort to eliminate both “deceitful practices in interstate commerce 
involving the misuse of trademarks,” and “other forms of 
misrepresentations which are of the same general character even though 
they do not involve any use of what can technically be called a trade-
mark.”25   The Lanham Act represents the codification of the federal 
trademark statute, which has clarified the definition and scope of a 
trademark to include 
 
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish 
his or her goods, including a unique product, from those 
                                                 
 
20 Ryan Isenberg, Trademarks and the Internet, 32 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 229, 234 
(2001) (citing Polaroid Corp., 182 F. Supp. at n.19). 
21 See id. 
22 Id. at 234. 
23 The Lanham Act is also commonly known as the Federal Trademark Act of 1946. 
24 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1096 (2005). 
25 Federated-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 1963).  
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manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source 
of the goods, even if that source is unknown.26 
 
Subsequent amendments to the Lanham Act have sought to add to or 
clarify this definition,27 but at no point has Congress occasioned to weigh 
in on the international application of the Lanham Act.   
 
[7] The Lanham Act has authority to regulate that conduct which is 
deemed to occur “in commerce.”28  Unlike patent and copyright law, 
Congress does not garner its ability to regulate this arm of intellectual 
property law from Article One of the Constitution.29  Instead, it is derived 
from the Congress’ power to legislate in matters of interstate and foreign 
commerce.30  There are several other ways in which trademark differs 
from patent/copyright, but the most notable is that patent and copyright 
law confer specific property rights, whereas trademark law only protects 
against similar uses.31 
 
[8] The Lanham Act differs from copyright and patent law in another 
notable way: it apparently can be (and is) applied to extraterritorial 
matters, following the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Steele v. Bulova 
Watch Co.32 and its progeny.  Scholars have long debated whether this 
international application of the Lanham Act is appropriate, or even 
whether it comports with International Law on its face.33  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
 
26 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2005). 
27 See, e.g., The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, supra note 1. 
28 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining commerce as “all conduct which may lawfully be 
regulated by Congress”). 
29 Sheldon W. Halpern, A High Likelihood of Confusion: Wal-Mart, TrafFix, Moseley, 
and Dastar – The Supreme Court’s New Jurisprudence, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
237, 239 ( 2005). 
30 Id. 
31 See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of 
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505 (1997). 
32 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
33 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 31, at 540 (arguing against the appropriateness of 
applying the Lanham Act extraterritorially); contra Yelena Simonyuk, The 
Extraterritorial Reach of Trademark on the Internet, [2002] DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9 
(pointing out the language in the Paris Convention impliedly authorizing some 
extraterritorial enforcement of trademark law). 
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neither the Supreme Court nor Congress have taken steps to modify the 
Lanham Act’s international reach since the Court’s decision in Steele. 
 
C.  TRADEMARK DISPUTES OVER THE INTERNET 
 
[9] “[T]he growing international and transnational nature of commerce, 
the spread of digital technology, and the ubiquity of the Internet, which 
together have provided a fertile ground for new trademark battles, have 
accompanied a broad legislative and judicial expansion of fundamental 
trademark concepts.”34  Trademark law in the United States has been 
extended from a simple subsidiary of unfair competition law to a complex, 
heavily litigated, and ultimately internationally divisive remedial system.35  
Not only has the range of subject matter encompassed under trademark 
law been augmented, but there has also been an expansive list of specific 
remedies proliferated, designed to address corresponding issues 
encountered due to technological and political changes in American 
society.36 
 
[10] As the Internet has taken its place as a bedrock of American society, 
entirely new questions of trademark law have emerged, which have made 
the issue of the Lanham Act’s extraterritorial application even more 
important.  The questions vary in their complexity.  For example, what 
qualifies as “use” of a trademark on the Internet?  Or, because the Internet 
itself is an American “product” and is “based” in the United States, does 
any conduct on the Internet fall within U.S. trademark jurisdiction?  In 
other words, could a foreign citizen who publishes a website potentially 
become subject to American trademark law?  If so, to what extent can the 
U.S. government enjoin the active trademark dilution a foreign defendant 
 
[11] This article will examine the international application of the Lanham 
Act in the extraterritorial protection and enforcement of trademarks, 
particularly with regard to the Internet and e-commerce, and attempt to 
prescribe a fair and reasonable solution to the somewhat conflicting 
doctrines underlying U.S. versus international trademark protection.  Part 
                                                 
 
34 Halpern, supra note 29, at 237-38. 
35 Id. at 238. 
36 Id. 
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One will center around the Lanham Act as it has been interpreted to apply 
internationally, discussing both positive and negative criticisms, as well as 
the compatibility of its transboundary scope with overarching international 
law.  Part Two will accept the international application of the Lanham Act 
and discuss how it is being applied to e-commerce on the Internet, paying 
special attention to some of the special problems presented by trademark 
law over the Internet. 
 
II.  BEFORE THE INTERNET: THE INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF THE 
LANHAM ACT 
 
A.  TRANSBOUNDARY MARKS AND THE PARIS CONVENTION 
 
[12] Generally speaking, a trademark is a function of territory, meaning 
that a given trademark will normally only receive protection of exclusive 
rights over the mark within a certain territorial boundary.37  The Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property provides for the basis 
of international trademark law.38  This philosophy is reflected in Article 
6(3) of the Paris Convention, which states “a mark duly registered in a 
country of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered 
in the other countries of the Union, including the country of origin.”39  The 
Paris Convention articles go on to contain a “national treatment” tenant 
supporting this approach to trademark law jurisdiction, stating that: 
 
[n]ationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the 
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other 
countries of the Union the advantages that their respective 
laws now grant, or may hereinafter grant, to nationals; all 
without prejudice to the rights specially provided for by 
this Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same 
protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against 
any infringement of their rights, provided that the 
                                                 
 
37 Timothy H. Hiebert, Foundations of the Law of Parallel Importation: Duality and 
Universality in Nineteenth Century Trademark Law, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 483 (Sept. – 
Oct. 1990). 
38 Simonyuk, supra note 33, at 22. 
39 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6(3), Mar. 20, 1883,  21 
U.S.T. 1629, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
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conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are 
complied with.40 
 
[13] Based on this, critics of international trademark application argue that 
a mark should only be enforced within the borders of the state in which it 
is registered; instead, each nation should take responsibility for the 
enforcement of trademark law within their own borders, and apply their 
own laws to any legal dispute.41  In other words, conduct taking place 
outside of the territory of the United States should not fall within the 
trademark law jurisdiction of the United States, and thus foreign 
infringement of a U.S. trademark does not logically have a place within 
U.S. jurisdiction.42 
 
[14] Despite this logic, however, history has repeatedly shown us that 
“[f]amous or well-known marks may well leap oceans and rivers, cross 
national borders, and span language barriers to achieve international 
recognition. They may frequently be protectable even when the foreign 
good or service to which they are attached is not yet readily available.”43  
It has been argued that the Paris Convention, in Article 6(bis), authorizes a 
country to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in some limited cases.44  
Article 6 basically states that a member state45 is prohibited from 
registering a mark that is a reproduction, imitation, or a translation liable 
to create confusion with a well-known mark known to be registered in 
another member state for similar goods.46  Some have argued that Article 
6 vests a member state with the authority to exercise jurisdiction over an 
activity taking place wholly outside of the geographical territory of the 
home state of the injured trademark owner.47 But questions remain as to 
                                                 
 
40 Id. 
41 Bradley, supra note 31, at 538-39.  
42 Simonyuk, supra note 33, at 10.  
43 Burk, supra note 18, at 720. 
44 Simonyuk, supra note 33, at 23. 
45 There are 169 member states to the Paris Convention currently in force.  See World 
Intellectual Property Organization, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited Sept. 
10, 2006). 
46 Paris Convention, supra note 39. 
47 See Roger E. Schechter, Comment, The Case for Limited Extraterritorial Reach of the 
Lanham Act, 37 VA. J. INT'L. L. 619, 638 (Winter 1997). 
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whether this is an appropriate interpretation of what the law is implying, 
and if so, to what extent is it meant to grant authority? 
 
B.  STEELE V. BULOVA WATCH CO.: THE INTERNATIONAL SHOE DROPS 
 
[15] Following the U.S. entry into the Paris Convention in 1896, it was not 
entirely clear as to whether the Convention would afford the U.S. latitude 
to bring extraterritorial trademark cases into U.S. courts.  Congress’ 1905 
Trademark legislation, the first modern version of American trademark 
statute, did not provide a simple answer to this question.48  After Congress 
passed the Lanham Act in 1946 (which was silent as to the international 
applicability of the new trademark act), it was not long before the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on this question.49   
 
[16] The seminal case in answering the question of the extraterritorial 
applicability of the Lanham Act’s protection for U.S. trademarks is Steele 
v. Bulova Watch Co., decided in 1952.50  In this case, a U.S. citizen 
obtained the Mexican rights to the widely-known “Bulova” name and 
subsequently began to manufacture and sell watches bearing that mark in 
Mexico; several of those watches found their way into the United States, 
despite being wholly the products of Mexico.51  Bulova brought suit in a 
Texas federal district court seeking both injunctive and monetary relief 
under the Lanham Act.52  Bulova had only registered their trademark in 
the U.S.; Steele had registered in Mexico several years before the 
inception of the lawsuit.53  The U.S. Supreme Court found Steele subject 
to the Lanham Act’s trademark protection provisions despite the fact that 
the apparently infringing behavior occurred outside of the territory of the 
United States.54 
 
                                                 
 
48 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 9, cmt.  e (1995). 
49 See Steele, 244 U.S. at 281-82 (granting certiorari to determine whether a United States 
district court has jurisdiction over acts of trademark infringement and unfair competition 
carried out in a foreign country).  
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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[17] In explaining its opinion, the Court stated that there has never been 
any dispute as to whether Congress had the authority to regulate the 
actions of U.S. citizens in their behavior extraterritorially.55  The Court 
pointed out that the Lanham Act specifically was intended to extend to any 
commerce over which Congress has the power to legislate.56  The Court 
was careful to emphasize the fact that Steele was an American citizen, and 
despite the apparent assembly and sale in Mexico, Steele’s conduct “had 
effect” within the United States, and so the jurisdiction did not have to 
depend on the territory in which the Bulova mark was placed onto the 
watch.57  Last, the Court decided that exercising U.S. jurisdiction over the 
matter was not contrary to international law, treaties, or the law of 
Mexico, based on the fact that Mexico had cancelled the registration of 
Steele’s trademark during the course of the litigation.58 
 
[18] In the wake of this decision, many questions were left unanswered, 
which lower courts have been forced to wade through in deciding whether 
and how to apply the reach of U.S. trademark jurisdiction.59  The Court, in 
rendering its decision, failed to articulate exactly on what principles it 
based its decision; in doing so, the utility of the opinion in the case 
became limited.60  It was never clarified whether Steele’s ties to the U.S. 
(most obviously his U.S. citizenship) were dispositive of jurisdictional 
issues, or instead whether the presence of the watches in the U.S. was 
what made jurisdiction appropriate.61  The Court did not issue a test that 
would clarify which issues were determinative to liability imposition or 
jurisdiction, nor did it prescribe any indication of what weight to accord 
different factors contributing to the liability of a trademark infringer.62  
Lower courts have adopted a varying series of tests, which generally 
examine some or all of three key factors: first, what effect does the 
infringing conduct have on commerce within the United States?; second, 
what is the citizenship status of the defendant?; and third, does a conflict 
                                                 
 
55 Steele, 344 U.S. at 282. 
56 Id. at 284. 
57 Id. at 287. 
58 Id. at 289. 
59 Bradley, supra note 31, at 528. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue1 
 
 
 
11
actually exists, or is a conflict likely to occur, between U.S. law and the 
law of the state in which the conduct takes place?63 
 
[19] As mentioned earlier, it is widely disputed as to whether there has 
ever been any authority for the United States to apply its trademark law to 
activities occurring outside of its territorial borders.  Some commentators 
have argued that the Court’s reasoning in Steele missed, and that Congress 
never intended for the Lanham Act to apply on an international scale.64  
Those commentators argue that, despite widespread dissent (of varying 
degrees), Congress has taken no specific action to amend the Lanham Act 
to include specific provisions for its international application, even if only 
for clarification purposes.65  This is not to say that there has been 
congressional inaction with regard to the Lanham Act.  To the contrary, 
many amendments have been made to the Act in the 45 year period since 
the Steele decision.66  Several of these amendments have dealt directly 
with sections that have “international implications.”67  Further, the 
Lanham Act uses the word “nationwide” where it could have used the 
word “worldwide;” had Congress used the word “worldwide” instead, it 
would clarify their intent to apply the Act beyond the territory of the 
U.S.68 
 
[20] On the other hand, some commentators have argued against these 
suggestions, as well.  For instance, based on congressional inaction, one 
can infer that Congress was satisfied enough with the way in which Steele 
interpreted the law that it did not find necessity to amend the statute.69  
And, although Congress’s use of the term “nationwide” makes it more 
difficult to extrapolate an argument for the extraterritorial application of 
the Lanham Act, Congress’s recognition of the declining value of a 
trademark should such extraterritorial protection not be offered cannot be 
                                                 
 
63 Id. (noting that the courts differ on the requisite amount of each prong necessary for a 
finding of liability). 
64 Bradley, supra note 31, at 531. 
65 Id. at n. 160. 
66 See, e.g., The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2005). 
67 Schechter, supra note 47, at 625. 
68 Id., at 628. 
69 Id. at 625. 
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disputed.70  Therefore, it could reasonably be inferred that Congress would 
understand and approve of the need for extraterritorial protection of a 
trademark, without which the mark would lose its value.71 
 
[21] Despite this dispute, as has been mentioned, neither the Court nor 
Congress have taken any action to overturn the way the Lanham Act is 
interpreted in Steele, regardless of whether it is potentially incongruous 
with congressional intent or even international law.  Therefore, the basis 
of international trademark dispute resolution in the United States still 
stems from Steele and its progeny as it interprets the Lanham Act. 
 
C.  THE PRESUMPTION OF STRICTLY TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. 
LAW 
 
[22] The Supreme Court has stated that there is a presumption that the 
“‘legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to 
apply only within the territorial boundaries of the United States.’”72  In 
other words, for an Act of Congress to have international effect, it must be 
explicitly shown that there was clear intent of Congress to create an 
extraterritorial application for the law in question.73  Proponents of the 
international application of the Lanham Act posit that this is only a “canon 
of statutory construction.”74  Admittedly, it is undisputed that Congress 
has definite power to pass laws affecting extraterritorial matters, which is 
made all the more certain when U.S. citizens are involved.75 
 
[23] Still, there has been an extensive line of common law applying this 
presumption of territoriality, spanning back the length of our nation’s 
judicial history.76  The Court found it permissible for congressional 
regulation of piracy on the high seas in 1818, but only in the case where 
                                                 
 
70 Id. at 628. 
71 Id. 
72 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) [hereinafter Aramco] 
(quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
73 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. 
74 Bradley, supra note 31, at 510-11. 
75 Id. 
76 Id., at 511. 
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specific statutory language shows its intent to do so.77  It held in 1909 that 
the Sherman Antitrust Act does not extend to the anti-competitive conduct 
of a U.S. defendant company in foreign countries.78  The Court has also 
applied the presumption of territorial application to a series of labor law 
cases between 1918 and 1963,79 after which point there was a lull during 
which some commentators have suggested the presumption seemingly fell 
out of favor with the Court.80   
 
[24] The Court then eliminated all doubt as to the applicability of this 
presumption with the Aramco decision in 1991.81  In short, Aramco held 
that the language of the statute in question lacked sufficient evidence to 
warrant applying it extraterritorially, despite several strong indicators to 
the contrary.82  The Court ignored the indicators, holding that, to apply the 
statute outside of the typical territorial scope (i.e. within the U.S.’s 
exclusive jurisdictional borders), the language of the statute would have to 
be so specific that it would require no inferences as to whether the statute 
extended beyond U.S. borders; rather, it would have to provide clear, 
unambiguous evidence that Congress intended an extraterritorial 
application.83  The Court reasoned that Congress was well aware of how to 
clearly state the intention for a law to apply extraterritorially and had done 
so many times in the past.84  Therefore, Congress could have easily written 
any intention for extraterritorial application into the statute.   Under the 
Aramco facts, the Court found it insufficient to simply infer from 
                                                 
 
77 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 (1818) (holding that, although Congress did have 
the power to regulate the conduct in question over a foreign citizen on a foreign vessel, 
they had not yet used that power; the statutory language lacked the required specificity to 
include the foreign citizen within its scope). 
78 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (holding that, when it 
is in doubt as to the intent of the language, the effect of a congressional act must be 
limited in its application to only within the realm of its general authority to act). 
79 Id. at 512 (citing to a series of labor law cases decided in the Supreme Court between 
1918 and 1963). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248-259. 
83 See id. 
84 Id. at 258. 
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essentially “boilerplate” language in the statute that Title VII was meant to 
apply extraterritorially.85 
 
[25] The Aramco decision, contrary to the decision reached by the Court 
in Steele, seems to again move toward a doctrine consistent with the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.  The Aramco Court distinguished 
Steele on a factual basis, saying that the disparity in the language used in 
the statutes did not permit equal treatment as to extraterritorial 
application.86  However, some commentators have argued that the Aramco 
decision actually represents a return to the presumption of territoriality, 
and that Steele simply represents a hiccup in American jurisprudence that 
cannot be reconciled with the subsequent decision in Aramco.87   
 
[26] If this is true, and perhaps the Aramco decision has been reached in 
such a way that is incompatible with Steele, what defense do trademark 
holders have against infringers acting in another jurisdictional territory?  
Of several suggestions that have been made by one commentator to 
resolve this, the most obvious is for a congressional amendment to the 
Lanham Act clearly delineating the transboundary scope of its 
protection.88  For now, the Supreme Court’s decision in Steele stands as 
the authority for applying the Lanham Act extraterritorially, Aramco and 
the presumption against extraterritoriality notwithstanding. 
 
D.  ZONES OF EXPANSION AND TERRITORIALITY 
 
[27] Geographic territories are often thought of as the rubric by which 
jurisdiction over trademark issues is determined.  But it is not always clear 
to what extent a product or producer has expanded its market, or to what 
                                                 
 
85 Id. at 250-51. 
86 Id. at 252-53 (holding that the broader language in the Lanham Act purporting to 
exercise power over “all commerce” gives a better indication of Congress’ intent for the 
Act to apply extraterritorially than Title VII’s general commerce language). 
87 Bradley, supra note 31, at 531-36 (presenting reasons why the Steele decision has 
failed to comport with the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
88 See id. at 569-84 (suggesting also (1) to bring suit in the foreign country in which the 
infringement is taking place; (2) for U.S. courts to apply foreign law; and (3) adapt 
contributory infringement principles from other branches of IP law to reach trademark 
infringers internationally).   
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extent they will expand in the future.  As a result, to secure marketability 
and reputation for trademark owners, the concept of a “natural zone of 
expansion” has emerged in common law.  A “natural zone of expansion” 
refers to a contiguous territory into which it can reasonably be expected 
for a mark owner to expand their market beyond their current territory.89   
 
[28] For example, it may very well be foreseeable for a Canadian mark 
produced in Toronto to expand south into the United States, depending on 
their business model, market strategy, and history of growth.  The natural 
zone of expansion concept would ideally afford common law protection to 
the Canadian mark when it reached the United States.  It may, however, 
not be foreseeable for that same Canadian mark to conduct expansion into 
China, and therefore a concurrent use of a similar mark in the Chinese 
market potentially may not be precluded simply based on the existence of 
a very similar mark in Canada.  But depending on the Canadian mark 
owner’s business plan, it may in fact be foreseeable for the Canadian mark 
to expand into China, thereby procuring common law protection. 
 
[29] These areas of expansion are only areas of “expected use,” not actual 
use, and the expected use must be based on more than the mere conjecture 
of a mark owner’s aspiration to expand into an area, so it is necessary to 
have a scheme for determining priority over a given area. 90   The Eleventh 
Circuit has held that a mark owner who has established goodwill in one 
zone using a mark similar to that of another mark owner in another zone is 
protected in their original zone, even in the case that they are not first in 
time to register their mark (absent bad faith).91  However, a mark owner 
who is second in time does not have that same protection in a zone of 
expansion; a mark owner who is first in time would likely have priority 
over that zone of expansion over a second in time mark owner.92 
 
[30] Needless to say, the notion of zones of expansion has presented many 
questions as to the common law application of the principle.  The fruition 
                                                 
 
89 Burk, supra note 18, at 707. 
90 Id. 
91 Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1028 (11th Cir. 
1989). 
92 Burk, supra note 18, at 707. 
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of some of these questions first emerged in the case of Vaudable v. 
Montmartre, Inc., wherein there was a dispute involving a New York City 
restaurateur who was accused of imitating the name and decor of an 
internationally famous Parisian restaurant.93  Though the case was decided 
on other grounds,94 the international reputation of the Parisian restaurant 
ultimately led to the enjoining of the New York restaurateur from doing 
business under that famous name.95  The result in this case has led to the 
suggestion that “famous marks will be protected from appropriation in the 
United States, even if they have never been used here, thus effectively 
recognizing an international zone of expansion.”96 
 
[31] This presents a generalized principle regarding common law 
protection of trademark, which has been shaped to a far finer standard by 
subsequent case law centered primarily on whether or not the infringement 
was done in a bad faith attempt to profit from the mark owner’s 
reputation.97  In the case of Koffler Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, 
Inc., it was again held that the zone of expansion of a foreign mark owner 
preserved the right to use that mark outside of normal territorial 
restrictions.98  In this case, a Canadian drugstore advertised over the radio 
close to the U.S. border, and the radio signals crossed into the United 
States.99  When a U.S. drug company in that area began using a similar 
trademark, the Canadian drug store brought suit in Federal District 
Court.100  The court found against the U.S. drugstore, holding that it was 
using the Canadian drugstore’s mark within that Canadian drugstore’s 
natural zone of expansion.101  This extended the meaning of the zone of 
expansion doctrine to marks even if they were not famous enough to 
necessarily warrant protection elsewhere in the world (as in the Vaudable 
                                                 
 
93 Vaudable v. Montmatre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
94 See id. at 335 (deciding eventually this case based on more generalized unfair 
competition grounds rather than strict application of trademark law.   
95 Id. 
96 Burk, supra note 18, at 720-21 (discussing Vaudable’s impact on international 
trademark application). 
97 Id. 
98 Koffler Stores, LTD v. Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 704. 
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case, which afforded protection to the Parisian restaurant based on the 
mark’s fame).  From this, one can infer that the fact that the mark’s natural 
zone of expansion had clearly spanned across territorial borders did not 
preclude common law protection of that mark.102 
 
[32] Following this case, the Federal Circuit Court declined to adopt the 
doctrine of concurrent territorial use103 and restricted the meaning of “bad 
faith” to a relatively narrow standard in the case of Person’s Co. Ltd.  v. 
Christman.104  In this case, a U.S. manufacturer intentionally copied a 
Japanese manufacturer’s mark, who later attempted to enter the U.S. 
market.105  The Japanese manufacturer sued, but the court held that 
because the Japanese manufacturer’s mark was not famous and the U.S. 
manufacturer had no knowledge that the Japanese manufacturer intended 
to enter the U.S. market, they did not act in bad faith.106  Further, the court 
held that bad faith could not be derived only from prior extraterritorial use 
– there must have been “knowledge of a prior actual user in U.S. 
commerce.”107   
 
[33] This ruling represented a sharp whittling away in how the courts 
would apply the zone of expansion theory.  Based on this ruling, it is clear 
that the zone of expansion was not going to be applied liberally, thereby 
affording little weight to foreign trademarks in the U.S.108  The court 
clearly stated that the Japanese mark holder’s claims, though well-
founded, did not have the authority to restrict commerce in the U.S.109  
This holding demonstrated that, although the Japanese mark holder 
obviously may hold a clear first right to the mark in a zone of expansion, 
the effect on U.S. commerce is the first and foremost interest of the court 
                                                 
 
102 Burk, supra note 18, at 721. 
103 Person’s Co. Ltd. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (dismissing the 
doctrine because the mark’s “foreign use has no effect on U.S. commerce” and could not 
be the basis of an argument that therefore someone who uses a mark in foreign commerce 
has rights to it in the U.S.).  
104 Burk, supra note 18, at 721 (citing to Person’s Co. Ltd., 900 F.2d at 1568).  
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Person’s Co. LTD, 900 F.2d at 1570 (emphasis added). 
108 See generally id. 
109 See id. 
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as it pertains to law within the U.S.  Apparently, the only way that the 
court would have found bad faith in the U.S. mark holder’s actions is if 
evidence existed indicating that the Japanese mark holder planned to enter 
U.S. commerce prior to the U.S. mark holder’s initial use.110  Despite this 
limitation on the zone of expansion theory, it remains a useful tool for 
looking at the application of trademark law to the Internet.  
 
III.  THE INTERNET: ENFORCING THE LANHAM ACT AT LIGHT SPEED 
  
A.  SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN TRADEMARK ON THE INTERNET 
 
[34] “The fact that the Internet is not in the world of bricks and mortar 
raises the question of what actually constitutes trademark ‘use’ on the 
Internet.”111  “Use” in trademark infringement over the Internet can take 
many forms.112  “Traditional trademark infringement actions are brought 
under the Lanham Act on a cause of action for infringement of registered 
marks, while Section 43 covers unregistered marks, claims for dilution and 
now cybersquatting.”113   
 
[35] There are now several special problems in trademark that result from 
“use in commerce” over the Internet.  As outlined in Ryan Isenberg’s 
article,114 “use in commerce” has expanded to include four unique areas: 
domain names, hyperlinks, meta tags, and framing.115  This is of course in 
addition to the traditional trademark cases that may arise.  Here, “use” on 
an Internet website seems to essentially fall within the definition 
prescribed by the Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” language as it is 
typically applied in the general market setting.116  Despite this difference 
                                                 
 
110 See id. (stating that the Japanese mark holder had no goodwill in the U.S. for the U.S. 
mark holder to garner from the use of the mark). 
111 Simonyuk, supra note 33 at 2. 
112 Isenberg, supra note 20, at 230. 
113 Id. 
114 Mr. Isenberg’s article provides a cogent background on the history of Internet 
Trademark and is referenced passim for background purposes.  See Isenberg, supra note 
20, at 230–34. 
115 Id. at 230-33 (identifying and describing trademark infringement potentially stemming 
from these sources). 
116 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1127 (2000). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue1 
 
 
 
19
in character, trademark infringement over the Internet stems from the 
same roots as its bricks-and-mortar counterparts, such as dilution and 
unfair competition.117 
 
[36] Domain names are the first and most immediately apparent area in 
which trademark infringement over the Internet can occur.  The domain 
name of a website, often times simply referred to as a web address, is the 
uniquely registered identifier which generally reflects a corporate name or 
phrase.118  To procure a web address, a person or entity must simply pay a 
nominal fee to Network Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”) or an agent and pick out a 
name not already previously registered.119  Due to the ease with which 
domains can be registered, many trademarked domain names were initially 
registered by enterprising entities other than the mark’s owners known as 
“cybersquatters,” who have been described as “speculator[s] who 
knowingly reserve a trademark as a domain name merely to sell it for 
profit.”120  NIS’ simple registration system allowed the proliferation of the 
cybersquatting phenomenon, with single entities often being responsible 
for the hijacking of dozens of famous trademark names.121   
 
[37] A related practice to this is referred to as “typosquatting,” which is 
the term used to describe a situation where someone will register a famous 
mark with misspellings, reversed letters, or other common typos built into 
                                                 
 
117 Simonyuk, supra note 33, at 1. 
118 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.1998). 
119 See id. (describing Toeppen’s business practice of registering famous marks or names 
of companies and then selling the right to use those names to those companies for vast 
profits). 
120 Keith Blackman, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resoution Policy: A Cheaper 
Way to Hijack Domain Names and Suppress Critics, 15 HARV. J. L. TECH. 212, 214 
(2001) (quoting Jennifer Golenveaux, What’s in a Domain Name?  Is “Cybersquatting” 
Trademark Dilution?,  33 U.S.F.L.REV. 641, 647 (1999)).]   
121 Jeremy D. Mishkin, Master of Your Own Domain - An Overview of the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 18 COMM. LAW 3, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/forums/communication/comlawyer/spring00/mishkin.html (2000) 
(describing Dennis Toeppen the “poster child for the cybersquatter” because of his 
particularly poignant, numerous and blatant endeavors into cybersquatting, which have 
included registering domain names for over 100 registered marks, including Delta 
Airlines, Lufthansa, Neiman Marcus, American Standard and Eddie Bauer, and 
demanding as much as $15,000 for the rights to a domain name;  see Panavision, 141 
F.3d at 1316. 
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the domain name in an attempt to either (a) redirect the web surfer to the 
cybersquatter’s own website (rather than the consumer’s intended 
website), or (b) get the famous mark’s owner to pay you to redirect the 
mistyped web address to the famous web address.122 
 
[38] A third problem that may occur with domain names is that more than 
one person may possibly have a legitimate claim to a domain.123  The 
seminal example of this is the Nissan case, wherein the Nissan car 
company (who was first in time to register their trademark) brought suit 
against a computer company of the same name, (after the owner’s 
surname) based on trademark infringement after it was found that they had 
registered domain names using the word “Nissan.”124  The Nissan court 
pointed out that, under the “likelihood of confusion doctrine,” the behavior 
of the Nissan computer company had resulted in consumer confusion for 
several reasons, including both initial interest confusion and actual 
confusion.125  The court found initial interest confusion because the Nissan 
name may have led a consumer to believe that this was a website for 
Nissan cars, and that alone is enough to find consumer confusion.126  The 
court then found actual confusion because of the fact that 90% of Nissan 
computer company’s revenue stemmed from visitors to the website 
clicking on automobile advertisements displayed on the website.127  
Despite this, the court was careful to point out that there is a “judicial 
reluctance to enjoin use of a personal name” even when it apparently 
infringes on a trademark, but that it was still possible to limit the use with 
a “carefully tailored injunction.”128  These examples of abuses and 
confusion over domain names led to the need for new legislation.  So, 
                                                 
 
122 John Papavasiliou, Using the Federal Trademark Registration Process to Create a 
Broader Yet Fairer Solution to Domain Name Conflicts, 11 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
93, 108 (Fall 2002 – Spring 2003). 
123 Isenberg, supra note 20, at 231. 
124 See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 246 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2000) aff’g 
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp.2d 1154 (Cal. 2000)., 
125 Id. 
126 See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v. Epix Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
127 Nissan, 89 F. Supp.2d at 1159. 
128 Id. at 1162 (citing to the Ninth Circuit opinion E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle 
Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1288 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
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following these cases (most notably the Toeppen129 cybersquatting cases, 
as mentioned supra), Congress enacted anti-cybersquatting legislation in 
1999 in the form of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
(“ACPA”).130  The general notion behind this was that “without a 
legitimate use of a domain name, the rights to use a domain name should 
not exist.”131  In addition to this, the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (“ICANN”)132 adopted its Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) in order to provide an “alternative to 
litigation in dealing with abusive domain name registrations.”133 
 
[39] The second special problem of trademark infringement on the Internet 
involves meta tags.  Meta tags are essentially background information on 
webpages, not readily visible to the viewer of a webpage, that are used by 
search engines (such as Yahoo! and Google) to index the content of a 
website.134  They are most often thought of in terms of “key words” about 
the webpage.135  They are particularly useful in the sense that they allow a 
search engine to determine what website might most directly address a 
search query entered into it.  They are categorized into four main species: 
resource type, key word, description, and distribution.136 
 
[40] For example, if a user types in “cook fish old bay” in an effort to 
figure out recipes for eating fish, any number of websites could be 
returned if they just contain the words “cook,” “fish,” “old,” and “bay.”  
Without meta tags, it’s certainly possible that a search engine could return 
a useful website; however, it would be just as possible for it to return a 
website containing the diary of Captain James Cook, who one day 
happened to make an entry in which he caught a large fish off of the Bay 
of Bengal when he was 37 years old.  The problem here is obvious.  
However, employing meta tags, this mistake is much less likely to ever 
                                                 
 
129 See generally Toeppen, 141 F.3d at 1316. 
130 Isenberg, supra note 20, at 231. 
131 Papavasiliou, supra note 122, at 108. 
132 See id. (explaining that ICANN holds an exclusive agreement with the U.S. for the 
governing of the assignment of names and numbers on the Internet).   
133 Id. 
134 Isenberg, supra note 20, at 231. 
135 Id. at 232. 
136 Id. 
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happen.  The website about cooking fish would have cooking terms, types 
of fish, methods of preparation, names of spices, etc., contained in the 
meta tags to give information about the focal points of the website; 
Captain Cook’s diary would have much different terms.  The point of meta 
tags is to give more than the simple meaning to the words on the page, and 
instead give context. 
 
[41] However, this brings up a whole new setting in which trademark 
infringement may occur.  The use of registered marks in meta tags has 
often provided a basis to bring an offender into court.  Some of the more 
famous examples involve the use of various “Playboy” trademarks in meta 
tag lines.137 Several cases have involved the use of both Playboy and the 
term “playmate” in a webpage meta tags.138  Another example involved an 
ex-playmate of the year, who was allowed to use the terms “playboy” and 
“playmate” in her website’s meta tags for fair use reasons.139  
Additionally, the state of the law on this subject has been settled in both 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals140 and Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals,141 who have both recently ruled on the use of meta tags to 
infringe upon other entities’ famous marks.  In the Seventh’s Circuit’s 
2002 opinion, which involved a case of a company using its competitor’s 
name in its meta tags, it followed the same line of reasoning as the Ninth 
Circuit, holding that the “initial interest confusion” that consumers 
experience, whether or not it results in actual confusion once they are 
viewing the website, is adequate for the imposition of trademark 
infringement liability.142 The court emphasized the overriding importance 
of the “misappropriation of [the Plaintiff’s] goodwill,” citing to the prior-
delivered Ninth Circuit decision, in which the court equated using 
                                                 
 
137 Isenberg, supra note 20, at 232.  
138 See, e.g., Playboy Enter., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 10359 (E.D.Va., Feb.2, 1998); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 
F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
139 Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Torri Welles, 7 F. Supp.2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 
140 Promatek Indus. v. Equitrak Corp.,  300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002). 
141 Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
142 Promatek,  300 F.3d at 812 (citing Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062).  
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trademarks in meta tags to “posting a sign with another’s trademark in 
front of one’s store.”143  The Court went on to suggest that  
 
[c]ustomers believing they are entering the first store rather than 
the second are still likely to mill around before they leave.  The 
same theory is true for websites.  Consumers who are directed to [a 
defendant’s] webpage are likely to learn more about [a defendant] 
and its products before beginning a new search . . . .144 
 
The Promatek decision was later amended to state that meta tag usage by a 
defendant is only available when the infringing company is actually using 
the trademark in such a way that is “calculated to deceive consumers” into 
believing that they are in fact the infringee entity, or that they have some 
affiliation with it.145   
 
[42] The third special problem resides in the use of hyperlinks (also 
known simply as “links”) on webpages.  Hyperlinks are simply marked 
instances on a website, generally (though not necessarily) corresponding 
to text or graphics, which transport the Internet user to another 
webpage.146  Though hyperlinks have not specifically come under fire in 
an abundance of trademark litigation as of yet, they certainly have the 
potential for it.  It has been alleged that hyperlinks can potentially cause 
trademark infringement problems in the form of “passing off, reverse 
passing off, and false advertising.”147 
 
[43] The last special problem over the Internet involves something 
referred to as “framing.”  Problems in framing basically stem from a 
website retaining its own content on a portion of an Internet user’s screen 
as the Internet user goes on to other webpages (thus creating a “frame” 
surrounding the second website).148  This particular problem has not yet 
had any extensive or dispositive case law around it.  However, the most 
                                                 
 
143 Id. at 813 (citing Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064).   
144 Promatek, 300 F.3d at 813. 
145 Id. at 814. 
146 Isenberg, supra note 20, at 232–33. 
147 Id. at 233. 
148 Lloyd L. Rich, Internet Legal Issues: Framing, available at 
http://www.publaw.com/framing.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
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prominently publicized example is provided by the TotalNews case.149 A 
few years ago, the Washington Post and other newspaper publishers 
brought suit150 against an Internet news service called TotalNews on 
several grounds, claiming that TotalNews’ framing practices were injuring 
them.151  In this case, TotalNews was using framing technology to 
“display the news organizations' information on the TotalNews [website] 
and was surrounding the frames with its own advertising.”152  The plaintiff 
newspapers alleged that TotalNews’ practice amounted to trademark 
dilution and that the framing practice was likely to confuse users in that 
they would be led to believe that the source of these advertisements, etc., 
were in fact the plaintiff newspapers.153  TotalNews ended up settling the 
case with the plaintiff news organizations, the terms of which required 
TotalNews to stop framing the other news organizations’ websites without 
express permission.154  Because Washington Post v. TotalNews never went 
to trial, the issues presented in the case remain largely unresolved.  
However, some experts have argued that an analogy to a well-settled line 
of cases involving the “repackaging” of trademarked goods would serve as 
a strong suggestion that another challenge to framing, as in the TotalNews 
case, would result in an imposition of liability on the defendant for 
violation of trademark law.155   
 
B.  APPLYING STEELE TO E-COMMERCE OVER THE INTERNET 
 
[44] Stemming from the aforementioned special trademark infringement 
problems presented by the Internet (domain names, hyperlinks, meta tags, 
and framing, as well as typical infringement), the extraterritorial 
application of trademark law must be addressed.  The first issue that must 
be addressed is whether Internet infringement ever actually reaches the 
                                                 
 
149 Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 
MINN. L. REV. 609 (1998).  
150 This case was settled before going to trial when TotalNews agreed to discontinue its 
practice of framing.  See id. 
151 Id.  
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question of extraterritoriality.156  If an Internet user accesses a website 
from within the United States, regardless of whether the website’s base is 
in a foreign territory, it is at least arguable that the mark was used in the 
United States, thus negating the need for trademark law that reaches 
extraterritorially.157  If the “use” is in fact determined to be “domestic 
use,” then it may overcome the fact that either the “physical situs of the 
files containing the mark, the server hosting those files, or the individuals 
responsible for those files” exist in a foreign territory.158  Thus, the 
definition of “use” becomes critical. 
 
[45] This issue was first discussed in the case of Playboy Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc. (“Playboy II”).159  In a prior case 
(“Playboy I”), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had granted an 
injunction enjoining Chuckleberry from using the confusingly similar 
mark “Playmen” for the distribution of their Italy-based magazine.160  
Despite this, in a parallel suit brought to enjoin Chuckleberry’s use in 
Italy, the Italian court upheld the use of the Playmen mark.161  The events 
giving rise to this case occurred several years later when Chuckleberry 
published an Internet website for its magazine, again using the mark 
“Playmen,” based in Italy.162  Playboy brought suit for a violation of the 
injunctive order granted in Playboy I, citing that the worldwide nature of 
access to Internet website was clearly in violation of the court order.163  
The court agreed, stating that the website equated to the circulation of a 
magazine (a “use”) within U.S. territory and ordered Chuckleberry to 
block U.S. access to the website.164 
 
                                                 
 
156 Burk, supra note 18, at 728. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g Inc. (Playboy II), 939 F. Supp 1032 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
160 Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., (Playboy I), 687 F.2d 563, 571 (2d 
Cir. 1982). 
161 Id. at 569 n.3. 
162 Playboy II, 939 F. Supp. at 1032. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 1039-40. 
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[46] While this case seems to give us an answer regarding the question of 
applying an extraterritoriality doctrine, commentators have suggested that 
the decision should be taken with the understanding that the procedural 
context of the case may have been a determinative factor.165  Because the 
court was able to exercise jurisdiction over Chuckleberry based on the 
prior injunction issued in Playboy I, it is unclear whether the court would 
have found in personam jurisdiction in Playboy II if it were brought as an 
original action which directly challenged the use of the Playmen mark on a 
foreign website (as opposed to being based on a prior action on which 
jurisdiction was undisputed).166  Further, because the decision in Playboy 
II was rendered from a court sitting in equity for remedial purposes, it is 
unclear whether such a result would have been rendered in an original 
action.167  Since the issue in Playboy II centered on a prior injunction and 
not the Lanham Act, it cannot be wholly ascertained whether the court 
would have been able to apply the Lanham Act to this seemingly 
extraterritorial situation on the Internet.168 
 
[47] If it should turn out that the more decisive issue in Playboy II was the 
procedural context, in which case Playboy II does not support the notion 
that access on a computer located within the U.S. equates to a simple 
application of the Lanham Act, then it may still be possible to reach 
foreign defendants using the Lanham Act’s extraterritorial arms, as 
articulated in Steele.169  As mentioned, the Steele case essentially provided 
that, if confusingly similar marks are used, even if that use occurs entirely 
outside of U.S. territory, it can still be reached by the Lanham Act if it in 
any way effects U.S. commerce.170  Should any such questionably 
infringing activity take place over the Internet, it has been said that the 
worldwide nature of the Internet would lend to finding an effect on U.S. 
commerce.171 
                                                 
 
165 Burk, supra note 18, at 728-29. 
166 Id. at 729. 
167 Id. (stating that a court sitting in equity has wide latitude to issue remedies in order to 
reach a “just and fair result”). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Steele, 344 U.S. at 287. 
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[48] The Steele extraterritoriality doctrine could also apply similarly as it 
did in a case involving Levi-Strauss.172  In this case, a confusingly similar 
product to that of Levi-Strauss’ was sold from China, though never 
actually within the United States.173  Based on the fact that the quality of 
these goods could reflect poorly174 on the mark owner, the court applied 
the Lanham Act extraterritorially, in line with the Steele rule.175  
Following the reasoning in Levi-Strauss, one commentator believes that 
this quickly translates to the realm of electronic commerce, wherein an 
American producer selling their goods over the Internet suffers injury (to 
reputation or otherwise) as a result of an infringer using a confusingly 
similar mark in a foreign territory, especially if the American producer has 
never before acted in that foreign market.176   
 
[49] The Internet provides an infinite thoroughfare by which the U.S.’s 
(and other States’) producers may market to the whole world.  The 
prevalence of the Internet throughout the world breaks down many of the 
barriers encased within the Steele decision on the limits of applying the 
Lanham Act to foreign defendants.  The issue that is presented is whether 
the Internet, coupled with the Steele interpretation of the Lanham Act, 
confers nearly limitless jurisdiction to the United States to enforce its 
trademark law on foreigners who may have otherwise never purposefully 
or even knowingly availed themselves to suit in U.S. courts.  Corporations 
all over the world consider the Internet a literal sine qua non for the 
operation of their business.  The future (and present, for that matter) of the 
business world is e-commerce via the Internet.  It is indispensable, for 
both tangible and digital goods and services.   
 
[50] This presents the potential for U.S. trademark jurisdiction to expand 
far beyond what the Court could have ever imagined or intended in 1952 
when it decided Steele.  In the midst of the proliferation of e-commerce, 
the Steele rule has become dated, and its continued literal application may 
                                                 
 
172 Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 984 (11th Cir. 1995). 
173 Id. 
174 This has nothing to do with the quality of the product.  When a trademark owner has 
no quality control over goods that may be mistaken for theirs, the law presumes an 
inferior product.  See id. 
175 Id. at 985. 
176 Burk, supra note 18, at 731. 
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lead to the U.S. interfering with the laws of other nations and international 
law.177  Additionally, the other side of that coin is that e-commerce’s 
proliferation may render it more possible for foreign trademark owners to 
reach U.S. infringers.178  More to the point, the notion of the simple 
publication of a website availing a foreign party to the jurisdiction of a 
United States or vice versa may become a harsh reality. 
 
[51] Earlier, this article discussed the case of Person’s Co. v. Christman, 
involving the Japanese mark owner who had unsuccessfully sought to 
enjoin the use of a similar U.S. trademark because of the lack of effect on 
U.S. commerce.179  This decision remains well-reasoned; however, in the 
context of e-commerce, a court could very well reach a different 
decision.180  If the Japanese mark holder had a website on which the mark 
was displayed, it would tend to indicate an effect on U.S. commerce, as 
the website would make the mark more likely to reach the U.S.181  
Additionally, just as the Internet makes it easier for the Lanham Act to 
reach foreign infringers of U.S. trademarks through Steele, “the 
prerequisites for enforcement against domestic infringers more often be 
satisfied in a networked world,” thereby potentially subjecting U.S. 
infringers to foreign laws.182   
  
C.  JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 
 
[52] All of this tends to create a slippery slope, at the bottom of which is 
the Internet universally dispensing with jurisdictional requirements in e-
commerce.  This is not a particularly appealing situation, as control and 
predictability are the bedrocks of our judicial system.183  Further, it has 
been said that the “current hodgepodge of case law is inconsistent, 
                                                 
 
177 See id. 
178 Id. 
179 See Person’s Co. LTD, 900 F.2d at 1568. 
180 Burk, supra note 18, at 731. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 See Margaret N. Kniffen, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action 
by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 82-83 (1982) (noting that 
predictability in the realm of commercial transactions is of tantamount importance 
because it affords citizens an opportunity to comply with legal standards).  
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irrational, and irreconcilable” when attempting to fit traditional 
jurisdictional analysis case law into the frame of the Internet.184  
Therefore, the U.S. must take adaptive steps to avoid a total absence of 
standards for predicting jurisdiction in the Internet/e-commerce era.  The 
Supreme Court has expressly pointed out that “as technological progress 
has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for 
jurisdiction . . . has undergone a similar increase.”185  As the times change, 
so too must the jurisdictional tools of our judicial system develop in 
parallel to new technologies.186   
 
[53] A good place to begin the analysis is the Supreme Court decision in 
International Shoe, which provides the basis of the United States’ personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence:  
 
[d]ue process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present 
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum 
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.187 
   
There are two categories of personal jurisdiction as applied to the Internet: 
general and specific.  General jurisdiction refers to a state exercising 
jurisdiction over a defendant “regardless of whether the cause of action 
arose from the defendant's activities . . . .”188  It is tested by the standard of 
“continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state.189  However, 
general jurisdiction has not as of yet been used as a justification for the 
exercise of jurisdiction “based solely on the existence of an Internet 
                                                 
 
184 Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More is 
Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925, 939 (1998). 
185 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958). 
186 Louis U. Gasparini, Comment, The Internet and Personal Jurisdiction: Traditional 
Jurisprudence for the Twenty-First Century Under the New York CPLR, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. 
& TECH. 191, 195 (2001). 
187 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
188 Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 910 (D. Ore. 
1999).  
189 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). 
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website.”190  Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, is when a defendant’s 
acts specifically lead to the accrual of the cause of action in the state 
attempting to exercise jurisdiction.191  Specific jurisdiction would be 
applicable to the Internet when there exists “substantial contact with the 
forum” even in the absence of the “continuous and systematic” contacts 
required for general jurisdiction.192  Because specific jurisdiction does not 
require a defendant to actually be physically present in the forum state, it 
seems to be a more useful and preferred basis for determining Internet 
jurisdiction.193 
 
[54] There have been several cases dealing with personal jurisdiction over 
the Internet, and have been decided with varying reasoning and results.194  
The standard has evolved to distinguishing between active and passive 
websites, as formatively articulated in the Zippo case.195  The court 
distinguished and classified websites as being either active, passive, or 
intermediate, based upon their level of interactivity: 
 
[a]t one end of the spectrum are situations were a 
defendant clearly does business over the Internet.  If the 
defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign 
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated 
transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal 
jurisdiction is proper . . . at the opposite end are situations 
where a defendant has simply posted information on an 
Internet website which is accessible to users in foreign 
jurisdictions.  A passive Web site . . . is not grounds for the 
exercise [of] personal jurisdiction . . . The middle ground is 
occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can 
exchange information with the host computer.  In these 
cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by 
examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature 
                                                 
 
190 Gasparini, supra note 186, at 195. 
191 Id. 
192 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472  (1985). 
193 Gasparaini, supra note 186, at 195. 
194 See id.  
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of the exchange of information that occurs on the 
website.196 
 
[55] This test is easily applied at both ends of the sliding scale between 
active and passive; it is not until the middle of the scale is approached that 
it becomes difficult to distinguish between the websites.197  The courts that 
have decided Internet jurisdiction cases have typically required 
“something more” than mere Internet advertising in order to find a valid 
exercise of jurisdiction; this represents “the dividing line between the 
middle ground in the Zippo sliding scale.198  However, it is unclear what 
exactly that “something more” is and what factors are relevant to making 
this determination; most courts subscribe to the “something more” 
definition from the Asahi Metals case.199 
 
[56] To address the jurisdictional issues that are called into question, it has 
been suggested that perhaps the Internet requires its own governance and 
jurisdiction, independent of territorial law.200  However, this is more of a 
fantasy than a workable reality for a number of practicality-based 
reasons.201  The most prevalent of these objections are that (1) “no one 
lives or works in cyberspace” and (2) no nation can reasonably be 
expected to agree to give up significant portions of their sovereignty to 
some newly conceived realm of existence.202  “The Internet medium 
differs from these other media in a variety of respects, but not so radically 
that a declaration of sui generis jurisdictional status is required.”203  
Instead, a more reasonable and feasible alternative may be a new 
multinational treaty on the application of trademark law given the new “e” 
face of international commerce.204 
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IV.  CONCLUSION: THE INTERNATIONAL INTERNET TRADEMARK TREATY 
 
[57] Given the above inquiry into the nature of trademark law as it applies 
internationally, it appears that, while there is currently a regime in place 
for dealing with questions as dictated in Steele, that regime was written for 
an earlier age and may not necessarily adapt well to the Internet and e-
commerce.  It is true that the present regime for dealing with trademark 
law appears to successfully adapt to issues in domestic trademark that 
arise out of the Internet.  However, it may be necessary to develop a new 
regime for the handling of international trademark law issues, specifically 
formulated to address the apparent borderless-ness of the Internet.  
Whether or not one chooses to agree with the ruling in Steele, it is in fact 
the current state of U.S. law as it pertains to the international reach of 
trademarks, Aramco notwithstanding.  The difficulties encountered in the 
international application of the Lanham Act over the Internet presents an 
opportunity to thoroughly and meaningfully update the regime left behind 
by Steele, as has been suggested by critics. 
 
[58] The growing trend seems to be toward a harmonization of 
international intellectual property law.205  Even experts who have argued 
for the benefit of not harmonizing intellectual property law for the 
potential positive effects it may yield in the marketplace have come down 
on the side of an international regulation regime for the enforcement of 
international trademark on the Internet.206  An international treaty toward 
this end, adopted with the hopes of protecting international trademark 
fairly and consistently, would be an ideal solution.  The purpose of this 
harmonization would be to enable mark owners to predict with some 
certainty the legal outcomes of steps they may take in the use of 
trademarks, which will result in an ultimately better protection for mark 
holders all over the world.  Additionally, such a harmonization would 
                                                 
 
205 Schechter, supra note 47, at 632 (pointing to the TRIPS agreement as evidence of a 
growing trend toward uniformity in international intellectual property law).  
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decrease the risk of loss to foreign and domestic market participants, as it 
promotes fairness in how it applies to those trademark holders. 
 
[59] The Internet’s influence has brought the necessity for comprehensive 
international standards for trademark protection to a critical point, and 
regardless of which direction we go from here, the result must reflect the 
reality of our globalized commercial society.  Any proposed solution that 
neglects to adequately address this reality is a failure on its face and will 
only serve to further complicate the issue. 
 
